A New Axis Against Ethiopia: Conflicting agendas, fragile alliances, and Ethiopia’s manoeuvrable reaction

By Mohammed Hagi (PhD)

Introduction

The recent establishment of a “Axis Against Ethiopia,” led by Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea, marks a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and beyond. This coalition, announced at a tripartite summit in Asmara, is a daring step that clearly presents itself as a destabilising force to Ethiopia, a country with enormous regional influence due to its population, military strength, and expanding economic clout. The very structure of this coalition, which clearly targets a single country, suggests a level of antipathy that could destabilise an already vulnerable region. Despite the outward appearance of togetherness, this union is founded on unstable footing. The coalition lacks a coherent and united objective, as the three members—Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea—have widely diverse interests and agendas.

At first view, the development of such an axis appears to be motivated by a common strategic vision, but a closer look reveals a fractured and opportunistic alliance. Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea all face internal and external challenges, yet their goals are far from similar. Mogadishu asserts that it opposes Ethiopia’s Red Sea access in line with its posture on safeguarding Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, its issues are essentially more local. Rather than sovereignty or more general geopolitical issues, these worries are mostly derived from domestic obstacles including extremism, piracy, clan-based politics, and the instability of its own administration, which stand in stark contrast to Egypt’s focus on maintaining its Nile water rights and Eritrea’s survivalist approach to regional power balancing. While their brief alignment may give the appearance of solidarity, the different and frequently contradicting agendas of these states indicate that this axis is intrinsically unstable. 

This Op-Ed digs into the precise factors behind Mogadishu’s reckless involvement in this axis, Egypt’s opportunistic use of the coalition to exert pressure on Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Eritrea’s deep-seated fear of Ethiopia’s growing dominance. It also emphasises internal opposition inside Somalia, where significant regions oppose Mogadishu’s dangerous manoeuvring, and contends that Somaliland’s independence and growing connection with Ethiopia provide a more viable and constitutionally grounded road for regional cooperation. Ethiopia’s response to this forming axis, particularly its strengthening connections with Somaliland, is important in combating this coalition. Finally, the Op-Ed argues that the axis’ inherent contradictions render it unsustainable, and that Ethiopia’s long-term strategic interests are best served by its engagement with Somaliland—a relationship founded on mutual benefit and international legitimacy.

Mogadishu: A High-Stakes Gamble

The most puzzling thing about this new alliance may be Mogadishu’s allegiance to the Axis. Somalia’s federal framework is far from solid, and the country is still severely divided along clan and regional lines. The Hawiye clan-dominated federal administration in Mogadishu has adopted an assertive stance by allying with Egypt and Eritrea, even though there is significant risk to the already delicate political structure of Somalia. This choice worsens internal divisions in Somalia and jeopardises the country’s relationship with Ethiopia, a crucial regional ally.

There is no denying Somalia’s dependence on Ethiopia in the war against Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia has contributed significantly to the subsequent African Missions in Somalia, which have been vital in containing extremist violence and offering some peace, especially in areas that are not under Mogadishu’s authority. The federal government of Somalia runs the risk of jeopardising this important alliance by provoking Ethiopia, which might have catastrophic effects on the country’s continued war on terrorism and its larger security system. Somalia’s federal states have benefited greatly from Ethiopia’s military and political assistance, and cutting ties with such a partner creates a gap that extremist organisations like Al-Shabaab may take advantage of.

Furthermore, the position taken by Mogadishu does not reflect the broader objectives of the federal member states of Somalia. Important areas such as Puntland, Jubaland, the South-West state, and Hiiraan have often expressed a desire to keep close connections with Ethiopia. These areas are aware of how crucial Ethiopia’s stabilising influence is for maintaining political stability as well as economic growth and security. Ethiopia is a crucial partner, especially for Somalia’s regional states like Puntland, Jubaland and South-West regions that depend on security and cross-border commerce for economic growth, due to its physical proximity and influence over regional trade routes. The leadership of these federal states views collaboration with Ethiopia as critical to their continued existence and development, further isolating Mogadishu’s confrontational posture.

Clan politics, namely the interests of the Hawiye clan, which controls the federal government, are a major factor in Mogadishu’s decision to join with Egypt and Eritrea. The necessity for unification among Somalia’s various regions and the larger national interest are overlooked by this limited focus on clan-driven power struggles. The federal government is playing a risky game when it pushes an agenda that benefits a particular faction rather than the entirety of Somalia. The federal states are aware of the dangers associated with alienating Ethiopia since they have considerable local influence and their own semi-autonomous governing institutions. They understand that Ethiopian assistance is crucial to Somalia’s tenuous stability and future development opportunities.

This makes Mogadishu’s bold change in foreign policy seem rash and ill-advised. The administration in Mogadishu runs the risk of further fracturing the nation by provoking Ethiopia. Additionally, it widens the gulf between Mogadishu and the federal states, many of which are already miffed about the unequal allocation of resources and the concentration of authority. In reaction to Mogadishu’s moves, Puntland, Jubaland, and other areas might step up their claims to autonomy, further undermining the federal government’s already precarious hold on power.

Mogadishu’s axis membership is not just a domestic bet that could cause internal instability in Somalia, but also a global blunder. Driven by petty political goals and clan interests, its affiliation with Egypt and Eritrea poses a threat to the delicate peace and stability that have been carefully established in Somalia with Ethiopia’s assistance, as well as to the federal states of the country. Mogadishu needs to reevaluate its hostile stance and recognise Ethiopia’s vital role in maintaining Somalia’s security, and economic expansion  if it is to stay stable.

Egypt: Pressure on the Nile Dispute

The participation in the Axis is predominantly motivated by apprehensions regarding the Nile River and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt relies on the Nile for 97% of its freshwater, thus any change in its flow threatens security. Ethiopia’s Blue Nile hydropower project, the GERD, has caused constant strife. There are worries that this project may diminish Nile water flow, impacting water supplies, agriculture, and the economy. Demands for foreign intervention and diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia to alter the GERD’s operational arrangements have been made. The desire to use the new Axis to squeeze Ethiopia is evident, aiming to politically isolate the country and shape international opinion by partnering with Mogadishu and Asmara. Alliances are used to strengthen the bargaining position and seek legal action through the UN and other international courts to safeguard water rights.

Involvement in the Axis is opportunistic, focusing on the Nile and GERD. The affiliation with these countries is not intended to establish long-term alliances or regional collaboration, unlike Mogadishu and Eritrea, which have a direct stake in Horn of Africa dynamics. The Axis is seen as a short-term way to force Ethiopia to renegotiate the GERD, with diplomatic efforts focusing on ensuring that colonial-era water rights are not violated. Support for Eritrea and Somalia’s security and politics is limited, with interest in the Horn of Africa centred on the Nile. The government realises that commitment to the Axis may decrease once GERD goals are achieved or deemed unattainable. The lack of long-term aims with allies reinforces the notion of using the alliance as a short-term ploy.

A history of prioritising local matters and avoiding regional crises suggests conditional Axis participation. There is a possibility of Cairo leaving the alliance if geopolitics change or the GERD situation improves. Water interests may drive this decision. There is little motivation to stay with the Axis if these are met, either through a new agreement with Ethiopia or international mediation, as this would conflict with broader foreign policy goals beyond the Nile dispute. Egypt’s Membership in the Axis Against Ethiopia serves to further GERD and Nile interests. This tactical alliance helps exert pressure on Ethiopia, but it does not establish a strategic collaboration with Mogadishu or Asmara. Commitment to the Axis may fade once Egypt’s water targets are met or the geopolitical backdrop changes. Thus, Cairo’s involvement is opportunistic and motivated by immediate concerns rather than regional goals.

Eritrea: A Paradox of Fear and Imagination

The complicated paradox surrounding Eritrea’s participation in the Axis Against Ethiopia stems from a combination of long-standing hostility and a pervasive sense of existential dread. Eritrea has seen a powerful and prominent Ethiopia as a direct threat to its own survival and status in the area for many years. Eritrea’s foreign policy is shaped by the long-standing tensions between Asmara and Addis Abeba, especially under the leadership of President Isaias Afwerki. As such, rather than being the outcome of a clear strategic strategy, Eritrea’s alliance with Mogadishu and Egypt is essentially a defensive manoeuvre meant to restrict what it perceives as an expanding Ethiopian dominance.

Eritrea’s internal survival issues, which frequently materialise as an inflated impression of dangers from Ethiopia, have a significant influence on this defensive stance. The narrative of Eritrea’s leadership has always revolved around the perceived threat posed by its southern neighbour, which has resulted in an aggressive and suspicious foreign policy. Eritrea’s interests, like those of Egypt, do not, however, perfectly coincide with Mogadishu’s. Eritrea is more of a reluctant member of the Axis than a strategic ally since its motivation is to protect its sovereignty and oppose Ethiopian influence, whereas Mogadishu’s activities may be driven by clan politics and regional aspirations.

Furthermore, Eritrea’s historical propensity towards isolationism and its fragile domestic politics make it intrinsically difficult for it to maintain its membership in this Axis. Its ability to form strong partnerships is hampered by its authoritarian and non pluralistic political system of government. Asmara has shown that its membership in the Axis is not a sign of a consistent or stable policy by alternating between times of isolation and advantageous alignments. Rather, it is indicative of a reactive approach moulded by internal weaknesses and a continuous search for safety in a turbulent environment. The country’s partnership within the Axis is more about survival than a cohesive strategy because of its perilous situation, which further complicates the coalition’s overall sustainability and stability against Ethiopia.

A Fragile Coalition: Diverging Interests, Unsustainable Alliances

The Axis is inherently unstable since the three member nations—Egypt, Eritrea, and Mogadishu—have disparate objectives and interests. Internal clan politics, particularly the ambition of the Hawiye-dominated government to establish control over Somalia’s federal states, are the main forces for Mogadishu’s involvement. Mogadishu wants to show power on the international scene and disassociate itself from Ethiopia, which has historically provided stability in Somalia’s internal conflicts, by standing with Egypt and Eritrea. But given how cautious many Somali regions are about upsetting Ethiopia, including Puntland, Jubaland, and the South-West, this is a risky policy that might backfire domestically. Due to the fact that these areas appreciate Ethiopia’s contribution for security and economic reasons, Mogadishu’s foreign policy choices are becoming more and more isolated within its own country. The federal government’s overall stance is weakened because of its emphasis on clan dominance over national unity, which leads to a lack of internal support for its membership in the Axis.

Egypt’s contribution, however, is limited to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and water security. Egypt does not see the Axis as a means of establishing long-term ties with Mogadishu and Eritrea or achieving regional hegemony. Rather, Egypt sees this partnership as a short-term means of exerting pressure on Ethiopia in relation to the Nile. Egypt’s interest in the Axis will fade if its main objective—renegotiating the terms of GERD—is either accomplished or abandoned. Cairo is unlikely to contribute to the alliance’s long-term upkeep given its scant involvement. Aside from its worries over the Nile, Egypt’s past retreat from the Horn of Africa also suggests that its commitment to this coalition is ephemeral. Egypt’s engagement in the Axis is consequently based only on short-term water security concerns, with no longer-term strategic alignment with Asmara or Mogadishu, making Egypt a weak link in the Axis.

Eritrea, on the other hand, is driven by the belief that Ethiopia is a rising regional force that threatens Asmara’s very existence. The Eritrean government’s membership in the Axis is motivated primarily by fear rather than a well-thought-out plan, since it is paranoid about Ethiopia’s influence. Eritrea’s membership in the Axis is extremely unstable due to its isolationist tendencies and long history of conflict with Ethiopia. While Egypt has a clear objective, Eritrea’s goals are more nebulous and focused on its perceived ability to survive in the face of Ethiopian domination. Because of this, Eritrea’s position within the Axis is erratic and motivated more by fear than by a clear strategic objective. Eritrea’s participation is therefore probably going to be sporadic or short-lived, depending on how serious of a danger Ethiopia is seen to pose. This partnership is untenable in the long run because the three Axis members—Egypt’s exclusive emphasis on GERD, Mogadishu’s internal power conflicts, and Eritrea’s defensive stance—lack a clear, unifying goal. The Axis will disintegrate due to the conflicting interests of its members in the absence of a unifying objective.

Somaliland’s Strategic Importance and Ethiopia’s Response

Ethiopia’s best course of action among this changing regional scene is to improve its ties to Somaliland, which contrasts sharply with the instability and division of Mogadishu. Though not internationally acknowledged, Somaliland is essentially a de facto sovereign state with a stable political system, developing economy, and dedication to democratic government. Somaliland has become known as a consistent friend in the Horn of Africa unlike Mogadishu, which is caught in internal clan conflicts and depends on outside players for security. Grounded in shared interests that transcends temporary benefits, the current Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement spans security, infrastructure, and economic cooperation. Apart from international law, this cooperation is mutually advantageous since Somaliland runs with great autonomy and independence. Particularly in view of the instability in Somalia, a stable Somaliland offers Ethiopia a safe buffer and a necessary economic partner.

Geographically, Somaliland’s closeness to Ethiopia makes it a natural commerce and regional security partner. Strategically situated along the Gulf of Aden, the Somaliland port of Berbera gives Ethiopia vital access to international markets, hence lessening its reliance on Djibouti for port access. Core of this strategic alliance is the development of the Berbera Corridor, a major infrastructural project connecting Berbera Port to Ethiopia. This corridor improves commercial flows and economic integration between the two countries, therefore strengthening Ethiopia’s economic resilience and helping Somaliland to grow at the same time. Beyond only economics, Somaliland offers a stable surroundings that could help Ethiopia’s demands for regional security. Unlike most of Somalia, where radical organisations like Al-Shabaab still provide major concerns, Somaliland has mainly stayed clear from such unrest. This makes the Somaliland-Ethiopia cooperation a necessary component of Ethiopia’s larger regional plan since it guarantees a consistent northern border and a trustworthy economic partner.

Politically, Somaliland gives Ethiopia some stability and predictability absent in Mogadishu. Somaliland has shown that it can run efficiently and autonomously while Somalia is still involved in internal strife and attempts to keep control over its federal territories. This makes it a far more appealing and stable friend for Ethiopia than Mogadishu, where clan-based politics and outside alliances like the most recent alignment with Egypt and Eritrea have compromised national unity. Ethiopia’s backing of Somaliland and strengthening of their economic relations help to sustain both countries’ positions in the area. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s interaction with Somaliland is based on pragmatic collaboration rather than controversial political recognition, hence it is unlikely to generate strong criticism from the international society. By contrast, Mogadishu’s relationships inside the Axis Against Ethiopia are motivated by internal strife and outside manipulation, thereby providing no long-term benefits. Ethiopia’s closer relationship with Somaliland, especially via initiatives like the Berbera Corridor, reflect a smart and sustained reaction to the changing dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

Why the Axis Cannot Halt the Somaliland-Ethiopia Partnership

The increasing alliance between Somaliland and Ethiopia is too strong to be thwarted by the so-called “Axis Against Ethiopia,” which consists of Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea. First and foremost, Somaliland is acknowledged as a sovereign state, and while not everyone agrees with this, it is becoming more and more accepted in a number of regional and global fora. Due to its increasing international recognition, Somaliland is now able to form the diplomatic and commercial ties necessary for its stability and growth. On the other hand, Somalia’s capacity to exert influence over regional dynamics is weakened by its persistent struggles with serious governance challenges and a deficiency of strong state processes. As a result, Somaliland’s statehood and its alliances with Ethiopia act as a safeguard against outside forces that originate from the so-called Axis.

In addition, Ethiopia and Somaliland’s close proximity makes a collaboration based on common security interests plausible. The two organisations deal with similar concerns, especially from extremist organisations like Al-Shabaab that undermine both their individual territorial integrity and destabilise the area. This common danger environment encourages military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and economic integration. Resilient, the alliance is based on shared advantages that outweigh the threat posed by the Axis. Somalia, on the other hand, is unable to project power regionally or exert control over its own territory, which makes its participation in any collective posture against Ethiopia primarily symbolic and ineffective.

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s assistance to the shaky administration in Mogadishu serves as more evidence of the Axis’s inherent contradiction. Ethiopia provides Somalia with military and logistical support in its ongoing war against Al-Shabaab, which is vital to Somalia’s existence as a political entity. It would be essentially counterproductive for Mogadishu to try to harm Ethiopian interests or alliances as doing so would put the security system that underpins Ethiopia’s government in jeopardy. Because of this dependency, a complicated dynamic is created in which the alliance that seeks to oppose Ethiopia simultaneously needs Ethiopia’s help in order to survive. In this regard, despite the Axis’s manoeuvres, the friendship between Somaliland and Ethiopia is safe and growing.

Conclusion

The Axis Against Ethiopia,” which consists of Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea, is an unstable alliance with conflicting goals and interests. Every Axis member has a different goal, which makes any coordinated plan against Ethiopia more difficult. For example, Mogadishu alienates large areas of its territory by taking the high-risk of siding with Egypt and Eritrea to oppose Ethiopia, where local governments and populations are frequently more concerned with regional stability than with the political manoeuvres of the central government. This internal discord runs the risk of further fracturing Somalia within itself and undermining Mogadishu’s legitimacy and efficacy. This will make it harder for the government to put up a united front against Ethiopia.

Egypt’s geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa and its long-standing concerns over Nile water rights are the main reasons for its engagement in the Axis. Cairo is unable to effectively interact with the larger regional factors that affect Somaliland and Ethiopia’s alliance, though, because of this narrow focus. Egypt’s dependence on partnerships with nations such as Somalia and Eritrea might offer short-term benefits, but it fails to tackle the fundamental structural problems in the area. Eritrea’s goals, on the other hand, are driven by an overblown perception of Ethiopia’s threat, which is based on old grudges and its ambition to dominate the area. Eritrea’s judgement is frequently clouded and its strategic calculations are distorted by this heightened feeling of threat, which further destabilise the coalition.

On the other hand, strengthening Ethiopia’s strategic alliance with Somaliland is the best way for Ethiopia to react to the changing Axis dynamics. This collaboration not only benefits both parties in terms of economic growth and security, but it also promotes stability in the surrounding area. Due to Somaliland’s distinct status as a largely stable and self-governing nation, Ethiopia is better able to exert influence and protect its borders from outside threats. By providing a cooperative framework in opposition to the Axis’ polarising policies, the Somaliland-Ethiopian cooperation establishes Ethiopia as a stabilising influence in the Horn of Africa. As a result, Ethiopia’s sustained cooperation with Somaliland is probably going to pay off handsomely, helping both countries to maintain their security and sovereignty while navigating the intricacies of regional politics. As a result, the Axis cannot obstruct the development of the Somaliland-Ethiopian cooperation, which provides stability in the face of greater regional unrest. AS

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Mohamed Hagi (PhD) is a diplomat, politician and academic currently serving as the Chief Representative of the Republic of Somaliland to Taiwan. Dr. Mohamed Hagi holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Department of History, Politics and Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University.