From Lost Cause to National Agenda: Ethiopia’s bold move to end landlocked isolation, secure coastal gateway

Berbera Port (Photo: Social Media)

By Abtamu Tahir Mohammed

Addis Abeba – Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, is also one of the world’s largest landlocked countries. This geographic reality has long been a significant constraint on its economic and geopolitical ambitions. But was Ethiopia’s landlocked status an inevitable outcome of history or the result of political missteps? To answer this, we must revisit key moments in Ethiopia’s modern history.

In the late 19th century, under Emperor Menelik II, Ethiopia successfully defended its sovereignty against Italian colonial ambitions at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. However, by then, Italy had already secured control over coastal territories, including what is now Eritrea. Despite this, Ethiopia retained access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab until the mid-20th century. The critical turning point came after World War II, when Italy relinquished its colonies. Under pressure from Western powers, the United Nations federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. Emperor Haile Selassie later annexed Eritrea in 1962, sparking a three-decade-long armed struggle for independence. The Derg regime, which overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974, inherited this conflict but failed to resolve it; instead, it escalated the war through brutal military campaigns.

The most decisive moment came in 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by Meles Zenawi, took power. After years of civil war, the EPRDF negotiated with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), led by Isaias Afwerki, resulting in Eritrea’s formal independence in 1993 through a UN-backed referendum. Ethiopia’s recognition of Eritrea’s independence cemented its landlocked status, a decision that remains controversial. Critics argue that Meles Zenawi should have secured Ethiopian access to Assab or negotiated a lasting agreement before accepting Eritrea’s secession. Supporters, however, contend that peace was the priority after decades of war and that Ethiopia had no legitimate claim over Eritrean territory. Regardless, the EPRDF’s decision under Meles Zenawi marked the final blow to Ethiopia’s maritime access.

For decades, Ethiopia’s landlocked status has been viewed as a significant geopolitical and economic disadvantage. Eritrea’s independence left Ethiopia reliant on Djibouti for over 90% of its maritime trade. Meles Zenawi largely abandoned the issue, treating it as an insurmountable challenge. However, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018, has reignited Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, transforming what was once considered a lost cause into a matter of strategic urgency.

Breaking the Landlocked Barrier

Before Prime Minister Abiy, discussions about Ethiopia’s access to the sea were often dismissed as unrealistic. The EPRDF, particularly after the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea, avoided the topic to maintain regional stability. The administration of Abiy, however, has boldly placed the issue back on the national and regional agenda. In 2023, the premier publicly declared that Ethiopia cannot remain landlocked forever, calling for a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution with neighboring coastal states. This marked a significant departure from previous policies that had largely accepted the status quo.

Prime Minister Abiy has approached the issue through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than force or coercion. His historic 2018 peace deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki normalized relations between the two nations, though Eritrea has not yet agreed to grant Ethiopia direct sea access. Ethiopia has also strengthened its economic partnership with Djibouti, investing in port infrastructure and railway systems to ensure more efficient trade. Additionally, in early 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, potentially granting Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera in exchange for political and economic cooperation.

This move, however, has sparked tensions with Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its territory. Despite these challenges, Abiy’s administration continues to engage with Somalia and other regional players to advance its sea access agenda. In December 2024, Ethiopia and Somalia reached a pivotal agreement to enhance Ethiopia’s access to the sea, formalized through the Ankara Declaration. This accord was brokered under the mediation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and aimed to resolve tensions stemming from Ethiopia’s earlier agreement with Somaliland, which Somalia viewed as a violation of its sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity while granting Ethiopia access to Somali ports under Somalia’s sovereign authority. Both nations committed to technical negotiations to finalize commercial arrangements by February 2025, reflecting a mutual desire for cooperation and regional stability.

High-level visits between the two countries played a crucial role in advancing this agenda. In January 2025, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made a surprise visit to Ethiopia, marking a significant step toward restoring diplomatic ties after a year-long rift. This visit underscored both nations’ commitment to resolving disputes and enhancing bilateral relations. Subsequently, in February 2025, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Mogadishu to meet with President Mohamud. These reciprocal visits facilitated dialogue and reinforced the commitments outlined in the Ankara Declaration, paving the way for technical discussions on Ethiopia’s sea access under Somali sovereignty.

Diplomacy, Strategy, and Regional Power Plays

Abiy’s pursuit of sea access is not merely about national pride—it is a critical economic and security issue. Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti leaves it vulnerable to high transportation costs and trade disruptions. Securing alternative sea access would reduce dependency on Djibouti, lowering import/export costs and making Ethiopian goods more competitive. It would also enhance Ethiopia’s regional influence, positioning it as a stronger economic powerhouse. Moreover, diversifying port access would mitigate risks associated with economic blockades or geopolitical instability.

However, the path to achieving this goal is fraught with challenges. Neighboring countries like Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia may resist ceding land or sovereignty due to economic and security concerns. Any aggressive moves could lead to regional instability and resistance. Additionally, global powers with vested interests in the Horn of Africa, such as the U.S., China, and Gulf states, could shape the outcome. Despite these challenges, opportunities exist. Ethiopia could negotiate port leases or trade agreements with Djibouti, Somaliland, or Eritrea. Promoting shared economic benefits could ease sovereignty concerns among neighbors. Ethiopia’s strong military presence in the region could also serve as a bargaining tool, though forceful measures risk backfiring.

Three potential outcomes emerge. Ethiopia may secure long-term port access through leasing or partnerships, achieving its goal through diplomacy and cooperation. Alternatively, regional resistance could stall progress, leading to a stalemate. In a worst-case scenario, failed negotiations and aggressive strategies could escalate tensions, risking conflict.

Therefore, Ethiopia’s recent quest for sea access is a complex geopolitical issue that requires careful diplomacy, historical awareness, and regional cooperation. One major consideration is maintaining its peaceful negotiations with all neighboring coastal states. Ethiopia must recognize the sovereignty of these nations while seeking mutually beneficial agreements. Any deal should emphasize economic partnerships, trade facilitation, and infrastructure development rather than territorial disputes, which could escalate tensions. Prioritizing dialogue and regional stability over unilateral actions will help prevent conflict.

Another critical factor is securing international support and mediation. The involvement of regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) can provide a neutral platform for negotiations. Additionally, major global powers with vested interests in the Horn of Africa, such as the U.S., China, and the European Union, may play a role in facilitating discussions. By framing its sea access quest as an economic and trade initiative rather than a geopolitical rivalry, Ethiopia can garner broader support and avoid external interference that could worsen regional instability.

Lastly, Ethiopia must consider the economic and security implications of any sea access arrangement. Developing infrastructure like ports, railways, and roads will require significant investment, which should be handled through transparent agreements. Security cooperation is also vital to prevent conflicts with armed groups or piracy threats in the region. A peaceful resolution will depend on Ethiopia ensuring that its access to the sea contributes to regional economic integration rather than becoming a source of contention. By adopting a cooperative, diplomatic, and economically focused approach, Ethiopia can achieve its maritime ambitions without destabilizing the region.

In conclusion, under Prime Minister Abiy, Ethiopia has revived its long-neglected aspiration for sea access. Through diplomacy, strategic partnerships, and economic reasoning, the Prime Minister has turned what many saw as a “lost cause” into a viable national agenda. While the ultimate outcome remains uncertain, one thing is clear: Prime Minister Abiy has forced Ethiopia and its neighbors to confront an issue that can no longer be ignored. Success will depend on diplomatic skill, regional cooperation, and a delicate balance between national interests and stability. AS


Abtamu Tahir Mohammed serves as a public relations and communication specialist at the Africa Center of Excellence for Water Management at Addis Ababa University.

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