By Batseba Kassahun
Addis Abeba – The recent meeting between Eritrea, Somalia, and Egypt in Eritrea will be geopolitical concerns for Ethiopia, given the complex history and ongoing disputes with these nations. The alignment of these three countries, each with its own interests conflicting with Ethiopia’s, could have far-reaching implications for the stability and balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
What’s in it for Eritrea?
As we all know, Eritrea was part and parcel of the brutal war on Tigray. Eritrea’s President, Isaias Afwerki, has shown clear disdain for the Pretoria Agreement. Eritrea’s opposition to the CoHA reflects its broader goal to weaken or even dismantle Tigray.
This antagonism is rooted in a long-standing rivalry dating back to the struggle against the Derg regime. The TPLF expressed its goals of independence and a separate identity for Tigray during this struggle, a move the EPLF never fully supported. This was followed by the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the late 1990s.
Despite the peace deal between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea in 2018, this fragile alliance was to undermine Tigray rather than fostering genuine cooperation, with statements like ‘game over’ on the Eritrean side. Eritrea’s support in the genocidal war against Tigray highlights Isaias’ broader regional ambitions. With Eritrea now positioning itself as a key player in the Horn of Africa, its discontent over Ethiopia’s growing influence, particularly Abiy’s efforts to assert Ethiopia’s claim to the Red Sea, further aggravates tensions.
Eritrea’s goal is to become the dominant force in the region, using its role in the Tigray war and its strategic alliances to assert control. By aligning with Egypt and Somalia, Eritrea seeks to challenge Ethiopia’s influence.
Egypt’s strategic maneuvers amid GERD disputes
Egypt’s interest in Ethiopia centers on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which threatens to alter the flow of the Nile, Egypt’s primary source of freshwater. For Egypt, the GERD represents a significant existential threat, and the country has repeatedly voiced opposition to its construction. Despite various diplomatic efforts, the dispute remains unresolved, with Egypt seeking international backing to pressure Ethiopia into limiting the dam’s impact on downstream water flows.
Egypt’s participation in the Eritrean-hosted meeting signals its intention to strengthen regional alliances that oppose Ethiopia’s dam project. Both Eritrea and Egypt are members of BRICS, an economic bloc that Ethiopia also joined, I think in January 2024. However, Ethiopia’s alignment within BRICS may not necessarily protect its interests, as Egypt continues to lobby for international support against the GERD as well as the balance of powers.
Adding to this complexity, Egypt receives substantial financial and military aid from the United States, a factor that influences Washington’s stance in the Nile dispute. Ethiopia’s neo-liberal economic policies and recent moves to engage more closely with the U.S. could enable the U.S. to balance the two countries in its interests.
Egypt’s involvement in Somalia’s peacekeeping efforts, particularly its growing role in providing military and financial support, is another layer in its broader strategy to curtail Ethiopia’s influence.
By aligning with Somalia, Egypt aims to not only challenge Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland but also diminish Ethiopia’s role in regional security initiatives. The tripartite alignment of Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia thus positions Egypt to apply coordinated pressure on Ethiopia from multiple angles—diplomatically, economically, and militarily.
Somalia’s shift in alliances
Somalia’s grievances with Ethiopia are primarily focused on Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, a move that threatens Somalia’s territorial integrity. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland has angered Somalia, which views the agreement as an encroachment on its sovereignty.
In addition to its internal struggles with the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland, Somalia continues to battle the extremist group Al Shabaab and Islamist State-Somalia, further destabilizing the country.
The instability in Somalia has broader implications for Ethiopia, which had been a key player in African Union-led peacekeeping efforts. However, Somalia’s recent decision to exclude Ethiopia from its future peacekeeping forces, while welcoming increased Egyptian involvement, signifies a shift in regional alliances that could weaken Ethiopia’s influence in Somali affairs.
Somalia’s alignment with Egypt and Eritrea poses a threat to Ethiopia, especially as these countries work together to undermine Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa. Further, the U.S. continues to support Somalia in its fight against terrorism.
Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea
Ethiopia’s interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly its desire to regain access to the Red Sea and establish itself as a regional power, have fueled disputes with its neighbors. Abiy’s ambition is to be viewed as the one who restored Ethiopia’s past glory as a land with sea access, and to divert attention away from internal affairs are additional factors.
While Ethiopia has received support from the U.S. due to its neo-liberal policies, this backing may not be enough to counter the trio of Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia. Egypt, in particular, has garnered significant international support in its opposition to the GERD, while Somalia’s internal instability and reliance on foreign support continue to shape its regional politics.
Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS also signals its attempt to diversify its diplomatic relationships and seek new opportunities for economic development or maybe to balance powers. Yet, despite these efforts, Ethiopia’s regional influence appears to be diminishing.
Washington’s balancing act between supporting Ethiopia’s development while also backing Egypt’s stance on the GERD and Somalia’s fight against terrorism leaves Ethiopia in a difficult position. The U.S. may not continue to support Ethiopia’s ambitions if they conflict with broader regional stability goals. AS
Batseba Kassahun holds a Master of Public Administration from New York University and is currently pursuing a PhD in Public Administration and Policy. With over a decade of experience in public service, she has led the Black Students Union at North Seattle College, designed and implemented e-learning programs focused on Peace and Security in Africa, and served as a Country Manager for an Irish social enterprise.
