Key Takeaways
- France is struggling to maintain its traditional influence in West and Central Africa. As a result, Paris is exploring opportunities to expand its presence in the East and South of the continent. This shift reflects the Élysée’s effort to adapt to evolving geopolitical shifts in the continent.
- So far, there is no clear indication of a major shift in France’s approach to the Horn of Africa. This approach still focuses on security more than economic engagement as a fundamental lever to enhance influence and improve partnerships.
- France faces significant challenges in enhancing its presence in the Horn of Africa, including its limited ability to regain appeal in Africa; financial constraints preventing large-scale investments; persistent regional instability; and growing international polarization and competition in the African landscape.
French President Emanuel Macron’s recent visits to Djibouti and Ethiopia on December 20-21, 2024 underscored Paris’ growing interest in the Horn of Africa. This trip is part of France’s broader strategy to reposition itself amid shifting geopolitical dynamics in Africa, where a rising wave of hostility toward its colonial legacy and presence is reshaping its influence.
Context and Significance of Macron’s Visit
This tour marks Macron’s second trip to the Horn of Africa, following his visit to Ethiopia in March 2019. The latest tour took place in a critical and unprecedented geopolitical context, shaped by several key factors, notably:
1. France’s Declining Influence in West and Central Africa
A series of military coups and political shifts in most former colonies, particularly in the Sahel, weakened Paris’ influence. Several countries have decided to end the French military presence starting with Mali (2022), followed by Niger and Burkina Faso (2023) and most recently the Ivory Coast, Chad and Senegal which have ordered Paris to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024.
2. Escalating Regional Tensions
The Horn of Africa is experiencing heightened geopolitical tensions, particularly between Ethiopia, its coastal neighbors and Egypt. Ethiopia’s growing maritime ambitions, coupled with transnational threats to shipping routes from non-state actors –including the Houthis, Somali pirates and extremist jihadist groups in Somalia – are contributing to regional instability.
3. Rising Foreign Competition in Africa
Global polarization and competition for influence in Africa, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean is intensifying. New international players, including China, Russia and Turkiye, are expanding their presence, leveraging shifting regional and international dynamics to challenge traditional Western influence.
During his visit, Macron acknowledged France’s waning role in Africa, attributing it to political transitions and shifting public opinion. He emphasized the continued strategic importance of France’s military presence in Djibouti as a gateway to both Africa and the Indo-Pacific.
In Djibouti, home to France’s largest military base in Africa with 1,500 stationed troops, Macron joined his soldiers for a Christmas meal. The visit also saw the signing of two key agreements: one for the construction of a new airport in Djibouti and another for the development of a national space agency. Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh hailed these agreements as evidence of the decades-long distinguished relationship between the two countries which was crowned by renewing the joint defense treaty during his visit to Paris in July 2024. This treaty, which extends France’s military presence in Djibouti for another two decades, legitimizes French military presence at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Over two years of negotiations with Paris, Guelleh’s government sought to revise the military agreement to secure greater benefits, including a potential increase in rent for the military base and a commitment from France to build a new airport. This aligns with both countries’ interests, as the agreement grants Paris the right to use Djibouti airports.
Djibouti itself is unlikely to have significant space ambitions, making the establishment of the proposed space agency more about strengthening French influence – especially in competitive contexts that include space. Notably, Turkiye signed a similar agreement with Somalia in 2024, highlighting the broader geopolitical contest in the region.
The cultural dimension of Macron’s visit was particularly evident in Ethiopia, underscoring France’s strategy to enhance ties with non-Francophone African nations. Macron and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated the newly renovated National Palace in Addis Ababa (the former home of emperor Haile Selassie), restored with €25 million in funding from the French Development Agency. France is also providing funding and technical support for ongoing renovation at the Rock-Hewn Churches at Lalibela in the Amhara region.
More importantly, Macron affirmed his country’s support for Ethiopia’s aspirations for sea access, emphasizing that discussions must adhere to international law. He also reiterated France’s support for Addis Ababa’s economic reforms, especially its debt structuring – of which €3 billion is owed to France – stating that the process will be finalized in the coming weeks.
Paris’ Motivations and Limits of Its Policy Shift in the Region
Macron’s recent tour of the Horn of Africa highlights key aspects of France’s evolving strategy and broader objectives on the continent. Several motivations underpin this approach:
1- Compensating for Declining Influence in Africa
As Paris struggles to maintain its appeal among governments and populations in its traditional spheres of influence in West and Central Africa, it is shifting focus toward expanding its presence in the east and south of the continent. This includes engaging with countries outside its colonial past, particularly non-Francophone states like Ethiopia, and Anglo-Saxon nations such as Nigeria and South Africa – the two most populous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This strategic adjustment by the Élysée reflects an effort to realign with geopolitical shifts, using the Horn of Africa as a foothold to counter its diminishing influence and restore its broader standing in Africa.
2- Securing Military Presence and Strategic Interests
France aims to maintain and strengthen its military footprint in the region, ensuring its capacity to safeguard security interests and project power. This is evident in the renewal of the defense cooperation treaty with Djibouti, a key strategic hub that allows Paris to expand its role in maritime security, maintain a presence along vital shipping lanes and respond to potential threats.
Additionally, France’s military presence in Djibouti serves broader strategic goals, including protecting its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean – including inhabited islands such as Réunion, east of Madagascar, and Mayotte in the Comoros archipelago – by integrating them into regional security cooperation frameworks. Paris also seeks to maintain a military foothold in the region to ensure its capacity to conduct evacuations during crises, as demonstrated in Sudan in April 2023, while bolstering its broader ambition of expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific.
3. Asserting France’s Geopolitical Weight
Africa, with its vast resources, human capital and historically aligned elites and military institutions, has long been a pillar of French influence, shaping its role in European and international power struggles, including during World Wars. As geopolitical dynamics shift and the Global South increasingly challenges Western unipolarity, France is determined to solidify its presence in this strategic region to solidify its relevance in the emerging global order.
This includes taking on leadership roles in shaping regional dynamics, maintaining influence over key political and security developments and offering African partners viable alternatives to the growing influence of rivals such as China, Russia and Turkiye. From France’s perspective – and that of its Western allies – the growing footprint of these competitors poses a significant geopolitical challenge. Their increasing control over vital waterways and trade routes threatens to reshape global energy supplies, trade flows and military mobility, potentially restricting France’s ability to project power and protect its interests in the region and beyond.
4- Deepening Economic Engagement
France views the Horn of Africa as a promising destination for investment and trade expansion. Paris is prioritizing economic cooperation and modernization efforts while seeking to maximize its influence through investment, trade and defense agreements.
Notably, France has secured major deals with Ethiopia to enhance its civil and military aviation capabilities, including the procurement of Airbus aircraft and Rafale fighter jets. Macron’s visit also aimed to stimulate trade and expand French investments across key sectors, including energy, transportation, infrastructure, telecommunications, mining and hydrocarbon extraction. Additionally, the French president may attempt to revive a previous agreement to support Ethiopia in rebuilding its navy – a project stalled by the Tigray war and Ethiopia’s subsequent pivot toward Moscow.
Conclusions
France’s recent moves in the Horn of Africa reflect a broader strategy to deepen relations and cultivate new alliances across the continent. While these efforts are not entirely new, they have intensified following its withdrawal from the Sahel-Saharan region. However, France’s approach remains predominantly security-driven, rather than prioritizing economic engagement as a primary tool for influence and partnership-building. As a result, Paris continues to lag behind key competitors like China and Turkiye. It is not among the top trading partners of Ethiopia or Djibouti, has a limited presence in Somalia and remains virtually absent from Eritrea.
France’s attempts to solidify its role in shaping the region’s political and security landscape face numerous challenges, the most significant of which are:
1. Diminished Appeal and Image – France faces limited options to restore its attractiveness and improve its reputation as its influence continues to decline in other parts of Africa.
2. Reduced Financial Capacity – Its ability to secure funding for large-scale investments and development projects in the Horn of Africa has weakened.
3. Regional Instability – Persistent fragility, vulnerability and political instability in the region complicate France’s engagement and long-term planning.
4. Intensified Global Competition – Growing international polarization and increasing competition across Africa, particularly from China, Russia and Turkiye, challenge France’s ability to expand its influence.
5. Shifts in US Policy Under Trump – The changing political climate in Washington following Trump’s return to the presidency, marked by his often-disruptive stance toward European allies, may reduce coordination between the US and Europe in key regions, including the Horn of Africa. This could make it more difficult for Paris to reinforce its presence, especially given the deterioration of the US position in Djibouti and the search for strategic alternatives such as Kenya and Somaliland.
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Editor’s Note: This op-ed was first published by the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an independent think tank based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. It is republished on Addis Standard website under the auspices of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between JAKENN Publishing PLC, the Publisher of Addis Standard tri-lingual publications, and EPC, providing mutual principles for content sharing.
