Commentary: Decoding the Ankara Declaration: Implications for diplomatic, security affairs past and future
By Tilahun Adamu Zewudie
Addis Abeba – Over the past six years, the diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia has undergone substantial ups and downs: at first, it seemed strong on the diplomatic surface, but it eventually deteriorated, failing the true tests of national interest and good neighborliness. A significant development that vividly highlighted this situation was the diplomatic fallout following the signing, on 01 January, 2024, of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The MOU aimed to provide Ethiopia with a maritime base and sea access in exchange for official recognition of Somaliland as an independent sovereign nation.
While the full content of the MOU was not disclosed, the way the MOU was signed and communicated raised increased concerns about its potential adverse impact on regional security and strained the diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Shortly, Somalia’s government raised the stakes by accusing Ethiopia of annexing part of its territory and vowed to revive Somalia’s irredentist claim over a portion of the Ethiopian land. Somalia severed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia without seeking official clarification from the Ethiopian government regarding the MOU.
Additionally, Somalia launched a massive diplomatic campaign to rally opposition to the MOU and condemn Ethiopia’s signing of it. Somalia also took diplomatic retaliation by dragging Ethiopia’s strategic rivals, such as Egypt, into the situation. The international community expressed serious concerns about the potential threats these developments pose to regional security while emphasizing the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are widely understood as discontent with the signing of the MOU.
The Ankara Ambiguity
While the interjections of many countries and intergovernmental organizations were limited to voicing their concerns, Türkiye took the lead in facilitating dialogue between Somalia and Ethiopia. Subsequently, the leaders of the two countries reached an understanding, as affirmed by the “Ankara Declaration.” This understanding eases diplomatic tensions and significantly reduces potential security risks.
However, the declaration was signed with the understanding that the two countries should “leave behind differences and contentious issues and forge in a cooperative manner to pursue shared prosperity.” This means that the parties have intentionally sidelined the MOU and all other past differences that strained their diplomatic relations. Whether that means the parties have abandoned previous initiatives, including the MOU, has been ambiguous. A textual interpretation of the Declaration suggests that it does not explicitly nullify or invalidate the MOU and other agreements signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
By avoiding past contentious issues, Türkiye’s diplomacy introduced a deliberate ambiguity at the negotiation table that could otherwise obstruct the dialogue. The Declaration would not have been feasible if the MOU and other previous Ethio-Somalia disputes had been brought up for discussion. On one hand, the Ethiopian government would not have publicly announced its withdrawal from the MOU, having already grandstanded its signing to the domestic populace to sway the people’s emotions.
On the other hand, the government of Somalia was already content with simple diplomatic statements affirming Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the assumption that such statements were tantamount to a rejection of the MOU. Turkey leveraged these tendencies and leadership styles of both parties. It validated the perspectives of both countries as a negotiation strategy and left the Declaration sufficiently ambiguous, allowing the leaders of both countries to interpret it in ways that fulfilled their domestic political goals.
As the scope of the Declaration was limited to the future rather than the past, all the agreements Ethiopia and Somaliland signed without explicit endorsement by Somalia’s federal government, including the latest contentious MOU, have neither been endorsed nor nullified by the Declaration. To this extent, the Ankara Declaration could be taken as a separate, stand-alone diplomatic understanding.
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s diplomatic recognition of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity does not, by itself, constitute a formal withdrawal from the MOU. As a member of the United Nations and a signatory to its core treaties, Ethiopia is already obligated to obey the territorial integrity of all sovereign states, including Somalia. Thus, reiterating this explicit obligation diplomatically does not create new or additional legal obligations for Ethiopia.
From an international law and diplomatic perspective, Ethiopia’s statement in Ankara is akin to reaffirming its commitment to international law. From the outset, the Ethiopian government did not acknowledge any violation of international law when signing the MOU, nor did it go to Ankara with this belief. The notion that Ethiopia has violated international law stems from controversial interpretations of Ethiopia’s diplomatic actions regarding the principle of territorial integrity. However, this line of interpretation may not be accurate, despite the ongoing legal debates surrounding such issues.
Access to the Sea vs. Sovereignty
The Ethiopian government’s diplomatic strategy in signing the MOU and communicating the potential benefits is of a nature that could pose serious security threats and may border a violation of international law. Nevertheless, the signing of the MOU as stated is not inherently illegal. Both in legal theory and in practice, signing a memorandum of understanding with an entity that possesses de facto statehood status without consulting the central government of the parent state does not outright contravene international law; however, the process of formalizing such deals could complicate matters and may border on violations of international law.
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s diplomatic relationship with Somaliland has been endorsed by successive governments of Somalia. Still, the timing and procedures the Ethiopian government followed to sign the MOU exhibited diplomatic mismanagement and a flawed communication strategy, raising significant security concerns.
The primary concern of the international community has been the repercussions of the diplomatic mishandling by the Ethiopian government rather than the recognition of Somaliland. Recognizing Somaliland, a strategically important entity that has functioned as a sovereign state for over three decades and held impressive democratic elections and political transitions, aligns with the national interests of many countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other nations in the West and the Middle East. Therefore, there is no reason for Ethiopia’s recognition to be a top agenda item for these countries, but the potential security risks that could arise from the recognition process. In fact, recognizing Somaliland is beneficial for these countries, and it would be prudent for them to champion or support recognition efforts while ensuring that the process does not destabilize the region.
One should not be misled into believing that the MOU is null and void due to the understanding expressed in the Ankara Declaration, as the declaration does not state that. The biggest significance of the Ankara Declaration lies in its potential to soothe the escalating diplomatic tensions that could unexpectedly escalate into armed confrontation and jeopardize the already fragile regional security.
Yet, despite the relatively clear textual scope of the Declaration, which effectively left out the MOU, its true meaning and effect depend on how both Somalia and Ethiopia view it. To date, the Ethiopian government appears not to have abandoned the aspirations outlined in the MOU, and the Somalia side has also denied that Ethiopia has been granted access to the Red Sea through Somalia or Somaliland.
On the other hand, the Ankara Declaration does not validate the grave diplomatic missteps made by the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia’s standing interest in accessing the sea and port services should be handled with maximum diplomatic caution and a well-strategized approach. Diplomatic actions taken before the right moment, without enabling national and geopolitical circumstances, cannot be sustained and may lead to counterproductive consequences.
The administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s approach lacked the necessary level of diplomatic sophistication. One might counterargue that Ethiopia has gained increased attention as a viable regional actor due to the signing of the MOU, regardless of its enforceability. However, it is more crucial to be recognized as a law-abiding country with a principled and established foreign policy than as a troublemaker and unpredictable regional actor. Furthermore, if actions are taken without adequate preparation and readiness, the consequences could spiral out of control, leading to counterproductive outcomes.
Based on empirical experience, the author of this article, a former Ethiopian diplomat to Somalia and a steadfast advocate for Ethiopia’s interests as opposed to the regime’s interests, was among those who raised serious criticism against the Ethiopian government’s diplomatic strategy and the timing of signing the MOU. The time for Ethiopia to recognize Somaliland is not ripe because of Ethiopia’s own internal issues and several geopolitical factors. Strategically, Ethiopia could benefit from pausing the recognition agenda and prioritizing close collaboration with Somalia and Somaliland through a pragmatic and realistic approach.
A Diplomatic Reset or a Temporary Truce?
The other question that merits explanation is if the Ankara Declaration does not address the causes of the very problem that triggered the dialogue, is there a risk of returning to diplomatic tensions? Will Ethiopia continue to implement the MOU in the near future, and is it in Ethiopia’s interest to do so at this time?
The Ankara Declaration did not establish confidence and trust between the two countries; it was merely a first step toward reducing diplomatic tensions. Even after the release of the Declaration, there is a conflicting interpretation of its implications for past undertakings and future areas of engagement. For example, Somalia suggested the end of Ethiopia-Somalia security cooperation through the upcoming peacekeeping arrangement in Somalia—AUSSOM. Somalia’s announcement is inconsistent with the spirit of the Ankara Declaration and relates to the consequences of the diplomatic missteps surrounding the MOU.
If the Ankara Declaration is followed, a relapse of diplomatic tensions to a level that threatens regional security seems unlikely. However, a lasting solution requires trust and confidence between the two countries built upon the Declaration. From the Ethiopian side, a hasty implementation of the MOU does not serve Ethiopia’s interests, nor does it align with the incumbent’s domestic political needs, as evidenced by recent reactions.
The Ankara Declaration has given the Ethiopian government a chance to take a lesson and revise its diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Somaliland’s recognition. The Ethiopian government may not repeat the same disorganization, negligence, arrogance, thoughtlessness, and poorly timed diplomatic decisions, along with unstrategized communication. Furthermore, given the developments following the MOU, the government must have realized that a diversionary foreign policy does not serve its domestic political objectives.
Confronted with widespread negative feedback from the international community due to frustrations with its decisions and flawed diplomatic strategies, the Ethiopian government is unlikely to repeat things that provoke further pressure. However, this does not imply that one can predict the future decisions and strategies of the Ethiopian government, as it has made several counterproductive choices in the past. Unpredictability is a hallmark of Abiy Ahmed’s leadership.
On the other hand, Hassan Sheikh Mohammad’s government has gained enough answers to the domestic populace from the Ankara declaration because of Ethiopia’s reaffirmation of Somalia’s territorial integrity, which is, in effect, nothing more than restating what international law dictates. Yet, since Ethiopia is not likely to grant official statehood recognition to Somaliland in the near future despite the pledge in the MOU, the Somalian government may view this as the result of its diplomatic achievement.
Furthermore, Somalia should avoid emotive diplomacy and demonstrate diplomatic temperance in dealing with the Somaliland issues. Somalia’s diplomatic reactions may determine the ripeness of Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland. An emotive and aggressive approach that endangers Ethiopia’s core national interests could lead Ethiopia to pursue the path of recognizing Somaliland as a last resort.
More importantly, the Ankara declaration serves Somalia’s national interest beyond the MOU as it paves the way for broader cooperation, including trade and investment, which will, in turn, contribute to Somalia’s peace and security.
Nevertheless, at least two factors could lead to a relapse in diplomatic tensions and potentially provoke broader conflict. One factor is Somalia’s absolutist and self-serving interpretation and application of the Ankara Declaration, which suggests that Ethiopia cannot engage with Somaliland without permission from Somalia’s central government. This belief that Ethiopia must establish its relationship with Somaliland solely through Somalia is inconsistent with the realities on the ground.
First, Somaliland exists as a successful, peaceful, and democratic entity that cannot easily be prevented from pursuing international relations with other states. Similarly, it is a fact that, like many other countries, Ethiopia and Somaliland maintain longstanding and widely recognized diplomatic relations and cooperation. Furthermore, beyond political and diplomatic developments, the peoples of Ethiopia and Somaliland continue to live intertwined lives, interacting in all aspects of daily life. The people-to-people relations and their daily interactions require acknowledgment and regulation. It is unrealistic and impractical to assume that Ethiopia can safeguard its national interests by negotiating exclusively with Somalia while ignoring Somaliland, especially with the issues between Somalia and Somaliland remaining unresolved.
Ethiopia’s national interests necessitate comprehensive cooperation and collaboration with Somaliland as long as the Somalia-Somaliland problem is unresolved. A sustainable positive relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia requires both Somalia and the international community to understand this pragmatic reality.
The Role of External Actors
Another potential factor that could contribute to a relapse into conflict between the two countries is the possible adverse role of external actors. Somalia serves as a geopolitical battleground for many states, even more so than many other African countries. The government of Somalia has established strong cooperation with states that have a strategic rivalry and disagreements regarding Ethiopia’s development aspirations and flagship initiatives. There is widespread wariness among Ethiopians that Somalia’s government may, whether intentionally or unintentionally, permit such actors to play a negative role in Ethiopia. If future developments align with these suspicions, the diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia will suffer.
Likewise, Ethiopia’s government maintains strong ties with certain actors who oppose the Somalia central government. These actors may exploit the Ethiopian government to further their interests in Somalia, which could also strain the bilateral relationship. Consequently, the diplomatic strategy both countries should adopt is to pursue interest-based foreign relations while remaining vigilant about the various conflicting interests. Both countries should demonstrate non-alignment and principled diplomacy centered on their national interests, without becoming instruments of other foreign actors. By doing so, both Ethiopia and Somalia can avoid being intentionally or unintentionally drawn into the “my enemy should be your enemy” state of affairs.
Lastly, an issue that requires attention is how Somaliland should view the Ankara Declaration. As an entity that aspires to statehood recognition and pursues diverse economic and security interests, Somaliland could greatly benefit from a careful evaluation of its lasting interests through a comprehensive approach. Somalilanders should pursue their interests in a way that does not destabilize the region, as that would also impact them. Somaliland should recognize that even if Ethiopia does not grant recognition to Somaliland based on the MOU, it remains one of the likely states that could eventually recognize Somaliland when a ripe moment comes, and its interests demand. Somaliland should not be fixated on a single interest when considering the fate of the MOU and its broader relationship with Ethiopia. Aside from the recognition issue, Somaliland still gains from signing the MOU, as Ethiopia would develop Lugaya, an underdeveloped coastal area, and increase its participation in Barbera and other regions for mutual benefit.
In conclusion, the Ankara Declaration represents a positive step that mitigates the risks of regional insecurity; however, it does not fully guarantee durable positive relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, nor does it formally nullify previous agreements. Establishing a sustainable relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia necessitates ongoing, sincere dialogue centered on national interests, deprioritizing regime interests, and reducing the risk of being an instrument of other regional actors.
Amid these troubling diplomatic developments, Turkeye has played a significant role, showcasing its assertive presence in the Horn of Africa, while many other entities, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have done little more than express their concerns over the diplomatic tensions. AS
Tilahun Zewudie is a legal and human rights expert with extensive experience in diplomacy and international relations. He has served for over a decade as a diplomat in Ethiopia’s diplomatic missions to Somalia, the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the United States. He holds advanced law degrees from universities in Ethiopia, South Africa, and the United States.
