By Muktar Ismail Issack
Addis Abeba – The specter of armed conflict looms ominously over Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)—a group that has evolved from an insurgent organization to a political party—issues its strongest warning yet about the potential collapse of the 2018 peace agreement with the federal government. ONLF Chairman Abdirahman Sheikh Mahdi (Maaday) has announced that the group is assessing “all options,” including a possible return to insurgency following years of deteriorating relations with Addis Abeba. The federal government’s alleged violations of the agreement, including restrictions on the group’s autonomy to peacefully engage in political activities and ongoing resource disputes, have deepened resentment in a region already plagued by systemic neglect, entrenched corruption, and violent crackdowns on dissent.
This crisis highlights the fragility of Ethiopia’s federal system under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party, which faces escalating conflicts with non-state militia, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Amid this turmoil, the ONLF has raised alarms about deepening grievance in the Somali region, where communities experience economic marginalization and political disenfranchisement despite significant energy reserves. A resurgence of armed resistance in the Somali region could further destabilize Ethiopia and impact the Horn of Africa, worsening cross-border tensions and humanitarian crises in a region long marred by violence.
Legacy of Struggle
Born in 1984 from decades of marginalization, the ONLF emerged as a response to Ethiopia’s historic suppression of Somali self-determination and exploitation of the Ogaden Basin’s oil and gas reserves. The group’s founding followed the 1977-1978 war in Ogaden, which solidified Ethiopia’s control over the territory through Soviet-backed force, leaving Somalis politically disenfranchised and economically plundered. For over three decades, the ONLF waged a guerrilla campaign against Addis Abeba’s extractive policies, which diverted resource wealth to federal coffers while leaving Somali communities in deepening poverty.
The Somali region, despite holding Ethiopia’s largest natural gas reserves, remains one of its most neglected regions.”
Ethiopia’s response was characteristically draconian: scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaigns, framed as counterterrorism, razed villages and displaced tens of thousands. The Somali region from 2007 to 2018 became a theater for state terror, with the former special police force conducting torture, enforced disappearances, and massacre—a killing spree targeting ONLF-linked clans. These atrocities, documented by Human Rights Watch, laid bare Ethiopia’s strategy of conflating local insurgency with treason.
The 2018 Asmara peace deal, brokered during Prime Minister Abiy’s reformist pinnacle, established a fragile truce. Mediated by Asmara, it promised DDR-mediated integration of ONLF fighters into state security and bureaucratic institutions, alongside formal recognition of the group’s political legitimacy. Yet federal apathy hollowed the pact, reflecting prior failed agreements. Less than 10% of ex-combatants were reintegrated, with most left destitute without sustainable livelihoods. The Prosperity Party’s recentralization agenda and refusal to permit civil political engagement have effectively resurrected the ONLF’s founding grievances—marginalization and denial of self-determination—pushing the group back toward resistance.
Unmet Promises
The ONLF’s resurgence stems from decades of unresolved grievances, including the erosion of Ethiopia’s federalism that promised self-governance for regions like the Somali Regional State and the systematic suppression of political space for opposition parties. Under the Prosperity Party, Ethiopia has reverted to centralized rule, undermining the autonomy that once helped quell the ONLF’s insurgency.
This centralization is embodied by the Somali regional administration under Mustafa Omar, a former reformist now criticized for corruption and repression he once denounced. His administration alleged embezzlement of 1.4 billion birr ($25 million) from a critical lifeline water project in a region where 68% of households lack clean water—exposing a brutal irony: resource-rich Somali territories remain impoverished while elites exploit their wealth.
The ONLF argues that Mustafa’s regime, supported by Addis Abeba, has weaponized state institutions to criminalize opposition. Tactics such as denying permits for rallies, obstructing party meetings and office operations across various districts, and arbitrarily arresting critics mirror the oppressive strategies employed by previous Ethiopian governments to suppress Somali demands for equity. These actions directly contradict the spirit of the 2018 peace agreement, which promised political inclusion in return for the ONLF’s disarmament.
This betrayal echoes historic patterns. The Somali region, despite holding Ethiopia’s largest natural gas reserves, remains one of its most neglected regions—a disparity fueling perceptions of internal colonialism. The ONLF’s original struggle, born from similar grievances in the 1980s, underscores a cyclical truth: without meaningful autonomy, equitable resource sharing, and political inclusion, promises of reform remain hollow. As infrastructure projects stall and opposition parties are silenced, Ethiopia risks reigniting the very insurgency it sought to quell, proving that repression only deepens the roots of resistance.
Coercive Tactics
The Ethiopian government’s strategy towards the ONLF reflects a familiar approach of co-optation and coercion, similar to methods employed against opposition groups in Tigray and Oromia regions. Mustafa’s administration has attempted to create a splinter faction within the ONLF, led by former deputy head Ahmed Yassin, to dilute the organization’s influence. This group was portrayed as the “legitimate” voice of ONLF interests, and its leaders were given positions in Mustafa’s cabinet in an attempt to bolster the administration’s narrative of inclusivity. However, this gambit quickly faltered as grassroots support for Maaday’s ONLF remained strong, sustained in part by clan allegiance and strong diaspora networks.
The failure of co-optation was soon followed by overt militarization. In September 2024, tensions escalated significantly when Ethiopian National Defense Force Chief of Staff Field Marshal Brigham Jula publicly declared the ONLF “an enemy of the state,” echoing rhetoric reminiscent of the pre-peace deal era. This statement marked a dramatic shift in the government’s stance toward the ONLF, effectively undermining the political legitimacy the organization had gained since the agreement. In response, the ONLF withdrew from the National Dialogue Commission, condemning the process as a façade for Abiy Ahmed’s growing authoritarianism.
Grassroots Resurgence
The resurgence of the ONLF is not just a revival of armed insurgency but a manifestation of deep-seated structural inequities and institutional decay within the Somali region. Cities like Kebri Dehar, Warder, Degahbur, and Jigjiga now anchor youth-led discord, fueled by systemic mismanagement, including widespread allegations of embezzlement of regional resources and delays in vital projects. This scandal, emblematic of entrenched kleptocracy, has galvanized calls for transparent governance, highlighting systemic failures to meet basic developmental needs in one of Ethiopia’s most marginalized regions.
Social media has amplified local grievances into transnational advocacy, with campaigns like #JusticeAndAccountabilityForSRS bridging domestic dissent and global awareness, emulating digital movements like the Arab Spring and the recent Gen Z protests in Kenya. The ONLF exploits this momentum, positioning its struggle as a universal fight against autocracy and exploitation.”
Critical to the ONLF’s resurgence is its symbiotic relationship with a politically active diaspora in major cities like Minneapolis, Toronto, and Oslo. These communities serve as financial and ideological lifelines, channeling remittances and orchestrating international lobbying campaigns to pressure Western governments to hold the Ethiopian government accountable. This transnational advocacy has elevated the ONLF’s profile, positioning it as a legitimate symbol of resistance for the Somali cause, despite its diminished military capacity.
To prevent renewed conflict, Addis Abeba must urgently revive the fractured 2018 peace deal with concrete actions rather than empty gestures.”
The ONLF has recently condemned a Somali Regional State-Poly-GCL meeting as an effort to “plunder Somali resources” while sidelining local rights. The ONLF has cautioned the Chinese firm about potential “repercussions” for pursuing oil and gas extraction in Ogaden without public consent. This warning echoes historical patterns of violence, notably seen in 2007 when ONLF rebels attacked a Chinese oil facility in Ethiopia, resulting in the deaths of 74 and the kidnapping of 7 workers.
While the ONLF’s conventional military strength has waned—current estimates suggest fewer than 5,000 fighters, a decline from its peak of 30,000 in 2008—the group may likely adopt a hybrid strategy combining grassroots mobilization with guerrilla warfare tactics aiming to erode governmental legitimacy rather than engage in direct combat. A senior ONLF commander stated, “Our battleground is the narrative of oppression, not open terrain,” utilizing the governance vacuum in rural areas with minimal state presence to maintain political relevance despite limited resources.
Ethiopia’s reliance on coercive tactics rather than addressing fundamental grievances poses a significant risk of entrenching instability. The ONLF’s ongoing demands for equitable resource distribution, autonomy, and political freedoms, coupled with counterinsurgency strategies reminiscent of those used in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, could further alienate civilians and provoke a formidable resistance against the Addis Abeba administration.
Path Forward
Ethiopia’s Somali region is at a critical juncture. To prevent renewed conflict, Addis Abeba must urgently revive the fractured 2018 peace deal with concrete actions rather than empty gestures. The ONLF demands include implementing the Asmara accord, prosecuting corruption, and safeguarding regional autonomy. Trust is low, as only 10% of ex-combatants have been reintegrated since 2018, raising skepticism about federal commitments.
International pressure and the African Union, the original pact’s architects, are essential, though the AU’s muted response to past crises raises doubts about its resolve. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Abiy’s refusal of third-party mediation risks further isolation.
The stakes are exceedingly high for Ethiopia, which is already grappling with economic crises and prolonged civil wars in the Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia regions. It cannot afford to enter another conflict. Escalation of fighting in the Somali region would heighten interethnic tensions, disrupt vital trade with Somaliland and Djibouti, and destabilize an area that is home to 200,000 refugees. Such chaos could also provide an opening for terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab to take advantage of the situation.
Chairman Maaday’s declaration—“We are out of patience”—serves as a dire warning for Ethiopia. Although the ONLF may not possess conventional military strength, its ability to engage in asymmetric warfare poses a significant threat to regional stability. However, the federal government has the tools at its disposal to prevent a crisis: conducting impartial audits of regional governance, expediting infrastructure development, and creating inclusive platforms for dialogue can help rebuild trust.
Ethiopia’s future depends on dismantling the exclusionary policies that have become entrenched under the Prosperity Party’s centralized rule, policies that have exacerbated ethnic divisions across the nation. Addressing the grievances of the Somali people is not just a regional necessity; it serves as a crucial blueprint for broader reconciliation and healing and offers an opportunity to avoid the catastrophic outcomes previously witnessed in Tigray, where neglect and miscalculation led to devastating conflict. The choice is clear: dialogue or disintegration. AS
Muktar Ismail Issack is a regional analyst, a former humanitarian and development advisor to the President of the Somali region, and a former UN staff member. He can be reached at [email protected]
